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Summary
After years of debate on the future of Kosovo and significant efforts by the inter-
national community to build functioning institutions, the Kosovo status question
has returned to the international agenda and may be settled within the year 2007.
The so-called Ahtisaari proposal that is currently under discussion in the UN
Security Council envisages an internationally supervised sovereign entity that is
committed to ensuring minority rights and special protection for all minorities in
Kosovo but also allows Kosovo to become a functional state. Apart from providing
Kosovo with de facto independence, another important aspect of the Ahtisaari pro-
posal is the central role allocated to the European Union within the future setting.
What consequences will the EU’s prominence have on the quality of the interna-
tional presence?
Since a new UN Security Council resolution will increase the EU’s responsibility to
help the new state strengthen its institutions and prepare for EU membership, it
will be of utmost importance for the Union and its member states to commit great
effort to making Kosovo “fit for Europe” in the years to come. While the Kosovars
must make every endeavor to create a secure environment with stable and demo-
cratic institutions and an integrated society, the EU must ensure long-lasting poli-
tical, financial and human resources support in order to make its presence as effec-
tive as possible. This applies particularly to assistance in the areas of rule of law and
law enforcement as well as in the preparation of legislation that complies with the
acquis communautaire.
The International Community Representative (ICR) should have sufficient authori-
ty to coordinate the activities of all international stakeholders and EU agencies in-
volved in Kosovo. Although the ICR will have significant powers to shape political
developments in Kosovo, it should avoid taking on an overly interventionist role.
Much depends in this respect on the policymaking style and personality of the ICR.
By effectively conducting the mission in Kosovo and proving that it can contribute
added value to international crisis management, the EU can demonstrate its matu-
rity as a capable foreign policy actor.
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Introduction
After years of debate on the future of Kosovo and significant efforts by the interna-
tional community to build functioning institutions, the Kosovo status question has
returned to the international agenda and may be settled within the year 2007. In
February 2007, UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari submitted his proposal for a sta-
tus settlement. This proposal was then presented to the UN Security Council, which
will ultimately decide on Kosovo’s future status. The so-called Ahtisaari proposal
envisages, on the one hand, an internationally supervised sovereign entity that is
committed to ensuring minority rights and special protection for all minorities in
Kosovo, especially the Serbian population. On the other hand, the proposal allows
Kosovo to become a functional state that may, for example, apply for membership
in international organizations such as the World Bank. Apart from providing Kosovo
with de facto independence, another important aspect of the Ahtisaari proposal is
the central role allocated to the European Union within the future setting. A new
UN Security Council resolution will increase the EU’s responsibility to help the new
state strengthen its institutions and prepare for EU membership. What consequences
will the EU’s prominence have on the quality of the international presence?
Assuming that a settlement similar to the Ahtisaari proposal can be reached in the
Security Council, this policy analysis focuses on the post-resolution situation in
Kosovo and places particular emphasis on the EU’s future role there. The analysis is
based on two preliminary remarks: First, although the EU should increase its efforts
to assist Kosovo in achieving economic growth, it must also admit that Kosovo is
unlikely to become economically viable and will almost certainly remain highly
dependent on EU funds for the foreseeable future. Second, it is evident that peace
and democratic progress can hardly be imposed by external actors but rather must
develop from within the country itself. It is the local population and not interna-
tional personnel who must build up the state. While the international community
needs to provide proper assistance, it should ensure that local institutions have suf-
ficient autonomy in order to reduce the risk that Kosovo will become an EU trustee-
ship for decades to come.
An essential precondition for the success of the Ahtisaari proposal is that the EU,
and particularly its member states, must demonstrate a clear commitment to
making Kosovo “fit for Europe”. The paper thus argues for robust political, financial
and human resources support from the EU.
1. UNMIK and the Kosovo Status Debate since 1999
With the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
placed the Serbian province of Kosovo under the transitional administration of the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and authorized the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR) as a peacekeeping mission. With the involvement of other inter-
national organizations, UNMIK consists of four pillars: police and justice, civil
administration (both operated by the UN), institution-building (led by the OSCE)
and economic reconstruction (implemented by the EU).
Although the question of Kosovo’s future status was not resolved in 1999, UNMIK
– while still maintaining control over certain functions such as foreign relations –
has gradually transferred governing competencies to the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government (PISG) in the years since 2001. These institutions include an elec-
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ted Kosovo Assembly, the Presidency, a government and courts. UNMIK also over-
saw the establishment of a multi-ethnic Kosovo police service. Thus for many years,
the international community has supported the establishment of political and eco-
nomic institutions in Kosovo. This institution-building process has thereby in-
directly supported the Kosovar nation-building process.
Following the recommendations of the UN-commissioned Eide report of October
2005, status talks between the Serbian government and a delegation of Kosovo
Albanian representatives (the so-called Unity Team) commenced in Vienna in
February 2006 and were led by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The most contro-
versial subjects included the protection of the Serbian minority (9% of Kosovo’s
population) and the heritage of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo; the decen-
tralization of the country; and minority rights. As no agreement could be mediated
between the parties, Ahtisaari delivered a draft status settlement proposal to leaders
in Belgrade and Pristina in February 2007 that covered a wide range of issues related
to Kosovo’s future. When another round of negotiations achieved no results,
Ahtisaari delivered his proposal to the Security Council on 26 March 2007.
2. The Ahtisaari Proposal and International Reactions
While it does not specifically use the word “independence”, the Ahtisaari proposal
envisages an internationally supervised sovereign entity that is committed to en-
suring minority rights and special protection for all minorities in Kosovo. At the
same time, the proposal would provide Kosovo with the rights to apply for member-
ship in international organizations such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, to create a lightly armed security force, and to adopt national sym-
bols (such as a flag and seal). It would thus allow Kosovo to become a functional state.
The proposal would also establish an International Community Representative
(ICR) who would supervise the implementation of the status settlement, possess
the power to take “corrective measures”in the political sphere, and serve as the final
authority in Kosovo. NATO would remain responsible for peacekeeping tasks.
Although the new mission would not be completely in the hands of the EU, the
Union would assume numerous responsibilities from the UN. Under the operatio-
nal management of an ESDP mission, the EU would exercise significant influence
over the areas of the rule of law as well as law enforcement. The EU would thus play
a central role in Kosovo’s political and economic life during the foreseeable future.
The Serbian government rejects the proposed status settlement and has stuck firm
to its position that Kosovo must remain part of Serbia indefinitely. The official
representatives of the Serbian minority in Kosovo also oppose the proposal. There
is no uniform position on the Kosovo Albanian side: While the government has
welcomed the proposal, many Kosovo Albanians are not satisfied with the fact that
it does not grant Kosovo a clear form of independence. This dissatisfaction cul-
minated in riots in Pristina in February 2007, in which two people were killed and
over 80 persons were injured.
3. Difficult Negotiations over a New Security Council Resolution
Because the decision on future status will not be taken by the two parties affected,
but rather by the international community, the coming months will be dominated
by complicated negotiations over a new UN Security Council resolution to replace
Resolution 1244. A decision will probably not be reached before mid-2007.
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In a Council meeting on 12 February 2007, EU foreign ministers expressed their
support for Ahtisaari’s proposal, arguing that it “creates the basis for Kosovo’s
sustainable economic and political development and for strengthening the stability
of the entire region”. The German EU Presidency declared that the proposal repre-
sents a fair, well-balanced and forward-looking compromise. Still, some member
states are uncomfortable with the proposal: in particular, the governments of
Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Slovakia will seek to delay a decision as long as possible.
In contrast, the United States – which has never disguised its support for the
Kosovo’s claims to independence – has been pressing for a quick decision together
with the British government. Because a unified EU position will be of great impor-
tance in Security Council negotiations, the German Presidency should use all its
diplomatic efforts to win the support of skeptical member states for the Ahtisaari
proposal.
While China’s position on the issue is not yet clear, the Russian government has
rejected the proposal and threatened to veto any solution that does not enjoy the
support of the Serbian government. However, with some diplomatic effort, it ap-
pears not unlikely that a compromise can be forged within the Security Council, for
the simple reason that there are more important subjects for Russia on the interna-
tional agenda. In fact, Russia appears more interested in its re-emergence as an
influential actor in global politics than in its traditional alliance with Belgrade.
However, despite the endeavors of some politicians to define Kosovo as a case sui
generis, factual independence may set a precedent for separatist movements in other
parts of the world and thus may have immense consequences for international law.
4. The Role of the International Community:
Creating a Bosnian Model in Kosovo?
As mentioned above, the status proposal includes many provisions that will create
an international presence similar to the one in Bosnia. Like the High Representative
(HR) in Bosnia, the International Community Representative (ICR) will play a cru-
cial role in Kosovar politics. The ICR, who will be a European, will take over the role
of the UNMIK head and will also become the European Union Special
Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo. As the final authority in Kosovo, the ICR will
supervise the implementation of the status settlement and will have the power to
take corrective measures to remedy any actions taken by Kosovo authorities that are
deemed to violate the settlement. These powers include the annulment of laws as
well as the dismissal of any public official, and are therefore similar to the powers
of the High Representative in Bosnia.
To ensure the coherence and effectiveness of the international presence, the ICR
will also coordinate the activities of all international actors, including the OSCE
mission, which will remain the main actor in the area of democratization. The ICR
will chair a committee comprising the KFOR Commander as well as the heads of
the ESDP and OSCE missions. The role of KFOR troops will not change signifi-
cantly: operating under the authority and political control of NATO’s North Atlantic
Council, the troops will remain responsible for ensuring Kosovo’s security against
external threats and providing a safe and secure environment until local institutions
are capable of assuming responsibility. Like the remnants of the NATO mission in
Bosnia, KFOR will also supervise the establishment and training of a future Kosovar
army.
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Although the ICR will also be the EU Special Representative, it will not be the EU
but rather the International Steering Group that will appoint the post. Because the
United States and Russia are also members of this group, they will retain strong
influence over future developments in Kosovo. The United States will also remain
an important actor in KFOR.
Although the ICR will resemble the post of the High Representative in Bosnia in
many respects, the “Ahtisaari design”will not necessarily install a “Bosnian model”
in Kosovo. In contrast to the latter, which is often criticized for not shifting true
responsibility to Bosnian authorities, the Kosovar model is more likely to be politi-
cally effective. Since ethnic Albanians will have a great majority in Kosovo, Kosovar
politicians are more likely than the Bosnians to assume “ownership” of their own
affairs. Day-to-day political decision-making is likely to function more smoothly,
and the ratification of a constitution that is truly accepted among the Kosovars and
that enables the state to function properly may be easier to achieve. Certainly, such
a constitution will have to be in accordance with the interests of all minorities. The
integration of the Serbian community into the new state will be one of the most
challenging tasks.
In Bosnia, the internationally sponsored Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995,
which were actually meant as a peace agreement, have not yet been replaced with
a true Bosnian constitution that would likely enhance the federal state’s capacity to
function more effectively. This failure is largely due to the constituent ethnic groups’
fears of losing political veto power – and particularly fears among Bosnian Serbs
that their entity might be abolished. The latest efforts to achieve such a constitution
failed in 2006. Because the status and the veto power of the Serbian communities
in Kosovo will not be comparable to those of the Serbian entity in Bosnia, Kosovo
might develop into a functioning system of governance more easily than Bosnia.
In order to establish a political system that differs from both the Dayton and
UNMIK models, the interventions of the ICR should be as limited as possible. The
role of the ICR should be that of an arbitrator between the political actors in Kosovo
rather than that of a proconsul. In addition, the European Stability Initiative’s recent
recommendation that an ombudsman be established who is empowered to investi-
gate complaints by Kosovars against the ICR and the international mission could
serve as an effective tool to strengthen the transparency and accountability of inter-
national actors. The EU should consider such an option as it would certainly help to
increase the legitimacy of the mission among the Kosovar population.
5. The European Union’s Rule of Law Function
What is particularly new about the proposed settlement is the fact that the EU’s
responsibilities in the area of reconstruction and economic development will be
supplemented by responsibilities in the fields of law enforcement and the rule of
law. This will represent a new experience for the EU in two ways: First, while the
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia – the EU’s largest civilian mis-
sion so far – was tasked only with monitoring and mentoring responsibilities, the
Kosovo mission will also include executive policing tasks and responsibilities for the
maintenance of public order.
Second, the integrated rule of law and police mission in Kosovo appears to repre-
sent a “lesson learned” from Bosnia, where rule of law activities have been carried
Recruitment of
specialized personnel
EU crisis response capacities
Role of the Council
Secretariat in ESDP missions
Tolksdorf · EU’s Future Role in Kosovo
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 1 · 2007 Page 9
out by different international and EU actors, which led to delays in rule of law
reforms. Presumably, the mandate of the integrated EU mission in Kosovo will
allow its members – comprised of at least 1,000 police officers, rule of law experts,
judges, prosecutors – to promote such activities as police investigations.
To avoid inheriting the image of the UN mission, which is not very popular among
Kosovars, the new EU mission is likely to exchange certain management personnel.
However, the room for maneuver also seems limited for the EU. It is often difficult
to recruit specialized and experienced staff for civilian missions. In the area of law
enforcement, for example, it is particularly difficult to recruit specialists in organized
crime, forensics and police administration. In many member states, it is difficult to
find senior experts willing to interrupt their professional careers to participate in EU
missions that often do not result in career advancement at home. Therefore, the
possibilities and incentives for enlisting qualified personnel to participate in civilian
missions need to be improved. Since they are responsible for recruitment efforts,
the member states should take the lead in this respect.
In several cases, UNMIK was criticized for fielding badly informed employees.
Consequently, the EU must ensure that all personnel are sufficiently trained for
their tasks. If the EU has the ambition to become a global player specializing in
civilian crisis management and peace-building, it must better address the mecha-
nisms for recruiting and training appropriate personnel.
6. Crisis Management Structures in Brussels: Increasing Rivalries?
The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council in Decem-
ber 2003, is implicitly based on the (self-)perception that the EU is better suited to
respond to crises and threats than other international actors. The ESS asserts that
the EU can apply “the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and con-
flict prevention [...] including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and
development activities”(p. 15). To do so, the Strategy calls for more active, coherent
and effective action in response to crises. The Civilian Headline Goal, adopted by
the European Council in December 2004, emphasizes the importance of developing
civilian crisis management capacities as an essential component of the Union’s
overall external policy.
The EU has led several peacekeeping missions, the largest being the European
Union Force in Bosnia. However, most of its crisis management operations have
involved civilian operations, such as police missions. This probably has less to do
with the often-debated comparative advantage of the EU in the area of civilian ope-
rations than with the simple fact that such operations are easier to organize and
operate than military missions. Both military and civilian crisis management opera-
tions are conducted under the European Security and Defence Policy, which is part
of the Common European Foreign and Security Policy, which is subsumed under
the second – and thus intergovernmental – pillar of the European Union. As a con-
sequence, the Council Secretariat, which coordinates the Council’s activities, has
acquired numerous foreign and security policy responsibilities which were not pre-
viously part of the EU’s remit.
Since 1999, many institutions have been set up in the Council Secretariat to support
ESDP operations. This has led to a certain level of competition with the European
Commission, which itself has been developing various instruments for civilian cri-
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sis response in recent years. Particularly in the area of peace-building, some mem-
ber states are wary of granting the Commission too many competencies through its
external assistance programs. While the budget of the Council Secretariat is limited,
the Commission can more easily provide the financial means for multiple forms of
external action. As a result, there is often no clear dividing line between civilian cri-
sis management under Pillar II and Community assistance programs with third
countries under Pillar I. For example, the Commission often funds rule of law mea-
sures in recipient countries, which may include support for police training and
reform. But because some security sector reform activities have a military dimen-
sion, there are reasons to argue that this area should be addressed by measures
governed by the second pillar.
With an increasing number of actions being implemented under the rubric of Justice
and Home Affairs (Pillar III of the EU), the issue becomes even more complex. The
fight against organized crime is a perfect example in which inter-pillar coordination
and cooperation is essential. Because the EU still lacks an external action service
(which is one of the key innovations set forth in the EU Constitution), the EU must
address the need to improve institutional coordination in order to conduct effective
crisis prevention and management. The process of reducing frictions between
Brussels institutions is already underway, and the Commission and Council conduct
joint meetings on issues of common interest and responsibility. Here, the Kosovo
mission can serve to stimulate improved institutional coordination, thus strength-
ening the EU’s ability to achieve its stated goal of implementing coherent crisis
management policies. In this respect, Kosovo will provide another testing ground
for the Union’s capacity to conduct complex operations.
7. Coordinating EU Agencies in Kosovo
In addition to the various international actors on the ground – including interna-
tional organizations, NGOs, and diplomatic missions – numerous agencies act on
behalf of the EU in Kosovo. As mentioned above, in accordance with a UN man-
date, the EU has been responsible for reconstruction in Kosovo since 1999.
UNMIK’s Pillar IV focuses on the modernization of Kosovo’s economic framework
and promotes the formulation of legislation to foster a sound business environment
that upholds European standards. The Euro was also introduced under the auspices
of Pillar IV and has served to provide Kosovo with a stable legal tender. In addition,
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) – which is not part of UNMIK’s Pillar
IV and is accountable to the Council and the European Parliament – engages in
tasks that include democratic stabilization, good governance, institution-building,
and economic development. The EAR has also implemented the Community
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) as the main
instrument for donor assistance. In January 2007, CARDS was replaced with the
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which brings all pre-accession sup-
port into one single instrument and is coordinated by the European Commission’s
Directorate-General for Enlargement.
In addition to UNMIK’s Pillar IV and EAR, the Commission’s Liaison Office pro-
motes Kosovo’s approximation to EU standards through the Tracking Mechanisms
of the Stabilisation and Association Process. The High Representative for the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, is represented in Kosovo
through his Personal Representative, who acts on his behalf in conducting political
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dialogue with local authorities. Furthermore, the EU Monitoring Mission monitors
political and security developments in the Western Balkans.
Thus there are many agencies in Kosovo that act on behalf of the Commission, the
Council, or both, and such a complex system certainly increases the likelihood that
some EU programs will overlap. In this respect, much will depend on the abilities
(and personal authority) of the EUSR and his staff to coordinate all EU activities in
Kosovo. If the overall responsibility of the ICR/EUSR is taken seriously by all actors
involved in Kosovo, the complex setting will not necessarily lead to coordination
problems.
8. The Security Setting
In the realm of security, it is certain that KFOR will remain an influential actor in
Kosovo. Should a new Security Council resolution be adopted, a robust KFOR pres-
ence will be crucial in order to respond to security risks, including potential violent
disturbances by Kosovo Albanians frustrated with conditional independence and
the ongoing presence of the international community as well as possible attempts
by Kosovo Serbs to separate northern Kosovo from the rest of the territory.
Furthermore, the restructuring of the security sector in Kosovo will be a great chal-
lenge for both KFOR and the international police forces. Successful security sector
reform is critical, because without effective domestic law enforcement capabilities
and sustainable police services, international efforts to reduce security risks such as
organized crime are much less likely to achieve their objectives.
According to the status proposal, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the demilita-
rized Kosovo Liberation Army, which has been responsible for tasks such as emer-
gency management since 1999, is to be dismantled within a year and replaced by a
new professional and multiethnic security force of 2500 lightly armed soldiers. How
to integrate those former combatants into other functions in Kosovo remains a mat-
ter of debate.
The division of tasks between the new ICR and NATO appears to be calibrated cor-
rectly. These were the only provisions in the Ahtisaari proposal that were not up for
negotiation when the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian delegations met for the last
time in Vienna in March 2007. However, because the EU would be responsible for
police restructuring and some executive policing tasks and the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR) would be responsible for military security, some potential for friction
within the international security presence would remain: as stabilization in Kosovo
increases, the focus is gradually shifting toward police tasks such as the fight against
organized crime. To illuminate a problem that may arise, the Bosnian experience is
instructive.
In Bosnia, the EUPM’s mandate includes support for the Bosnian police in comba-
ting organized crime. With a large number of troops and a mandate that allowed it
to provide operational support to Bosnian authorities, EUFOR and its first com-
mander David Leakey took actions to disrupt organized crime networks, for exam-
ple through border checkpoints. However, overcoming organized crime typically
requires police and legal experts rather than peacekeeping troops. Disagreements
over authority on this issue were finally settled through an agreement granting
EUPM the right to review and decide whether an involvement on the part of
EUFOR in this area is necessary. The High Representative has the primary respon-
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sibility for coordination. In order to prevent coordination problems in Kosovo be-
tween the various international stakeholders that, in contrast to Bosnia, are mostly
not part of the “EU branch”, the EU must ensure that the division of responsibilities
and methods of cooperation between KFOR and EU police are clear from the
beginning.
If the security situation stabilizes quickly, it is most likely just a question of time
until an EU force takes over KFOR’s peacekeeping tasks. As EUFOR troops in
Bosnia are reduced, more European troops are likely to become available for
Kosovo. The U.S. government would certainly welcome any reduction of its troops.
However, such a decision should be in accordance with the needs and interests of
Kosovo authorities.
After all, it can be argued that the need for traditional peacekeeping troops in ope-
rational situations like today’s Bosnia and a future Kosovo is becoming increasingly
limited. Both places are therefore likely to become a testing ground for the
European Gendarmerie Forces. These police forces with military status were de-
clared to be fully operational in June 2006. As situations involving military combat
are unlikely in Bosnia today, gendarmerie forces that specialize in performing public
order tasks such as riot control would appear to be more appropriate than peace-
keeping troops.
In Kosovo, the necessity of such forces became apparent in the March 2004 riots in
Kosovo, in which 19 people were killed and hundreds injured. On 10 February 2007,
two protesters that were part of a Kosovo Albanian protest against the Ahtisaari
proposal died as a result of injuries caused by rubber bullets fired by UNMIK police
troops. Of the 80 injured protesters, many were also hit by bullets. Taking political
responsibility for the use of excessive force by the Kosovar and international police
forces, UN police commissioner Stephen Curtis and Kosovo Interior Minister
Fatmir Rexhepi resigned from their posts.
This incident demonstrated that, even after nearly eight years, the international
police apparently remain inadequately prepared for specific forms of unrest. This
aspect is all the more important as effective police forces will be of critical impor-
tance in the months to come. If similar problems were to occur early on under EU
stewardship, it would provide an inauspicious beginning that would undermine the
EU mission’s legitimacy from the outset.
Conclusion
Due to the EU’s position as one of the main international actors in Kosovo, it will
be of utmost importance for the Union and its member states to commit great 
effort to making Kosovo “fit for Europe” in the years to come. While the Kosovars
must make every endeavor to create a secure environment with stable and demo-
cratic institutions and an integrated society, the EU must ensure long-lasting polit-
ical, financial and human resources support in order to make its presence as effec-
tive as possible and thus to legitimize its strong position in Kosovo. Only under
these conditions can the Ahtisaari proposal succeed.
Although the international community – especially the EU and its representative,
the ICR – will have significant powers to shape political developments in Kosovo, it
should avoid taking on an overly interventionist role. Therefore, the “Ahtisaari
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design”should differ from both the Dayton and UNMIK models. Much depends in
this respect on the policymaking style and personality of the ICR. In fact, all the EU
can provide in the long run is assistance, particularly in the areas of rule of law and
law enforcement as well as in the preparation of legislation that complies with the
acquis communautaire. However, the EU and Kosovo should not regard the acces-
sion process as a panacea.
Regarding the practical side of the EU presence, the Union should ensure that it is
able to deploy sufficient and well-trained staff. Nothing de-legitimizes peacekeep-
ing and peace-building efforts more than untransparent structures and ignorant or
even corrupt personnel. The EU should also ensure that the new ICR/EUSR has
sufficient authority to coordinate the activities of all EU agencies involved in
Kosovo. To avoid overlapping areas of responsibilities, the mandates of the interna-
tional stakeholders in Kosovo must be clear. And to help prevent a repetition of the
March 2004 incident, smooth cooperation between KFOR, EU police and local po-
lice authorities is particularly important in the initial period following the adoption
of a new Security Council resolution.
Finally, to ensure integrated EU responses in the future – in Kosovo or elsewhere –
the Union should increase the coherence of the various policy instruments it
applies. This refers particularly to the adjustment of policies carried out by the
Commission and by ESDP institutions. By effectively conducting the mission in
Kosovo and proving that it can contribute added value to international crisis
management, the EU can demonstrate its maturity as a capable foreign policy actor.
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